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     The Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez, Senior District Judge for the United States*
District Court, District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
          
No. 07-2951
          





          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(No. 05-cv-0105)
The Honorable James Knoll Gardner, District Judge
          
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 15, 2008
Before: McKEE and GARTH, Circuit Judges, and RODRIGUEZ, District Judge*
(Filed      June 20, 2008   )
OPINION OF THE COURT
      The statute, 53 P.S. § 46186 (1966), provides:2
All original appointments to any position in the police force . . . shall be for
a probationary period of not less than six months, and not for more than one
year, but during the probationary period an appointee may be dismissed
only for a cause specified in section 1183 of this act.  If at the close of a
probationary period the conduct of fitness of the probationer has not been
satisfactory to the council, the probationer shall be notified in writing that
he will not receive a permanent appointment.  Thereupon, his appointment




Matthew L. Bartal appeals from the District Court’s Opinion and Order granting
the motion of the Borough of Laureldale for summary judgment.  The underlying
Complaint alleges, inter alia, that because Bartal has a property interest in his
employment, his termination without a hearing violated his right to procedural due
process conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  For
the reasons below, we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.
I.
Because we write solely for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and
procedural history of the case, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.
Bartal was hired by the Borough of Laureldale, Pennsylvania as a full time civil service
police officer on April 15, 2003.  Pursuant to 53 P.S. § 46186 (1966), Bartal was subject
to a one year period of probationary employment.   On May 5, 2003 Bartal was charged2
with five counts of criminal conduct and he subsequently plead guilty to at least one of
      The charges were: felony criminal trespass pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(I);3
summary criminal mischief pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(5); disorderly conduct
pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a); and two counts of summary harassment pursuant to
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1). The parties disagree over the charges to which Bartal entered
pleas of guilty. 
3
the charges on June 23, 2003.  3
On March 18, 2004, Bartal received a letter from the Borough informing him that
his probationary period was going to be extended past April 15, 2004 “due to the two (2)
felony trespass counts being re-filed by Lebanon County, PA against you and your
brother.” (A50.)  In a subsequent letter, dated April 14, 2004, the Borough informed
Bartal that he was placed on administrative leave without pay. (A46.)  Bartal was
terminated on April 19, 2004 — four days after his probationary term ended. (A51.)
The District Court granted summary judgment, concluding that Bartal was an
employee-at-will by virtue of his probationary status and, therefore, did not have a
property interest in his employment. Acknowledging the lack of binding precedent in both
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit, the District Court reasoned
that because Bartal was placed on administrative leave prior to the conclusion of his
probationary period, he failed to successfully complete his probationary term.  The
District Court also held that the Borough had a reasonable period of time after the
completion of the one-year probationary period in which to determine whether or not to
retain Bartal.  On these grounds, the District Court concluded that the Borough’s decision
to terminate Bartal was within the time frame permitted by the civil service statute and
that the completion of a probation period does not immediately confer permanent
4employee status.  We agree.
II.
This Court has jurisdiction over appeals from all final decisions of the District
Courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same test as the District Court.  MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426
F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2005).  Summary judgment should be awarded only when “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  All
reasonable inferences must be made in favor of the nonmoving party, and the court may
not weigh the evidence or assess credibility.  Id. 
III.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits governmental deprivation of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.  U.S.Const. amend. XIV; Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).  Probationary employees are considered employees at will and,
therefore, have no property interest in their employment.  Upper Makefield Twp. v.
PLRB, 753 A.2d 803 (Pa. 2000).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not directly
addressed whether a term of probation can be extended by a municipality or whether the
successful completion of a probationary term translates into the immediate conferment of
a property right in one’s employment.  However, the Court’s discussion in Balsinger v.
      The Court was interpreting 53 P.S. § 46186 (1947) as not requiring that the4
probationer be notified in writing of his termination before the expiration of the
probationary period.  The present version of the statute contains the phrase “probationary
period of not less than six months and not more than one year”, which replaced the phrase
“probationary period of six months” contained in the 1947 version. 
     Because we affirm on other grounds, we need not address whether a probationary5
term can be extended beyond the one year limitation promulgated in 53 P.S. § 46186
(1966).
     This conclusion fits squarely within the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s general view6
on the purpose and effect of probationary terms.  See Travis v. Teter, 87 A.2d 177 (Pa.
5
Zelienople, 240 A.2d 807 (Pa. 1968) is instructive.
The probationer in Balsinger was notified at a hearing that occurred during the
probationary period that he was not receiving a permanent appointment.  Id. at 808. 
Although Balsinger was at this hearing, he did not receive the written notice of his
termination until after the expiration of his probationary term.  Id.  The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, interpreting a previous version of the probationary statute at issue here,
stated that the statutory notice of termination need not be “instantaneous.”   Id. 4
Here, the Borough’s letters that extended Bartal’s probationary term  and placed5
him on administrative leave, which were both sent to him within the probationary term,
placed him on notice of the Borough’s dissatisfaction.  Bartal’s termination notice came
only four days after the probationary term ended.  Therefore, like Balsinger, the fact that
the notice of termination did not arrive within the probation term is inconsequential and
we are persuaded that the Borough’s retention of Bartal for four days beyond the
expiration of his probationary period did not confer him with a permanent appointment.6
1952)(Commenting on the purpose of an educational probation period, the Court stated
that “. . . a wise and fair appraisal of performance . . . can best be made after the . . . entire
probationary period has ended . . .” and therefore a decision on permanency can be made
within a reasonable amount of time after the end of the probationary period.); see also
Salked v. Civil Service Commission, 6 Pa. D. & C.2d 535, 537 (Pa. Com. Pl.
1955)(Relying on Teter for the conclusion, under a different probation statute, that a
police officer’s retention “beyond the probationary period of six months was [not] ipso
facto equivalent to a permanent appointment.”)
     On this point, the decision of the Northern District of Texas in Scott v. City of Dallas,7
876 F.Supp. 852 (N.D.Tex. 1995) is instructive.  There, the District Court found that
police officers did not have a property right in their employment where they were placed
on administrative leave prior to successfully completing their probationary term.  The
statute in that case specifically required successful completion of the probationary term to
obtain a property right in the employment.  However, the fact that the court ruled that
placement on administrative leave interrupted successful completion of the probationary
term is persuasive. 
6
As important is the fact that Bartal was placed on administrative leave prior to the
conclusion of his probationary term. (A46.)  As a result, he did not successfully complete
the requisite one year of probationary employment.   Bartal’s placement on administrative7
leave interrupted his successful completion of the probationary term.  Under these facts, it
cannot be said that Bartal had a property right in his employment, as he was still under the
veil of probation and was, therefore, an employee- at- will at the time of his termination.  
For all of these reasons, Bartal was not deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process because he was a probationary employee at the time of his
termination.  Therefore, we will affirm the decision of the District Court granting
summary judgment in this matter.
